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DYING, AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTS - A JEWISH LAW
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical advances have made it possible to extend life or defy death as it was
known for centuries and have also compelled ethicists and health professionals
to rethink our definition of death. Moral issues surrounding application of
medical advances upon issues of death and dying have assumed a preeminent
position among societal concerns. These moral issues relate to a matrix of other
complex issues: the extent to which we should consider the psychological
effects of extended long term illness upon the victim and his or her family;
defining quality of life and how it bears upon the decision-making process; and

1Professor, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and
Faculty Advisor to the Journal of Law and Health; B.A., Adelphi University, J.D., Cornell
Law School, LL.M., New York University.
The author thanks his former student, Linda Hurwitz Sher, whose Judaic Law
course paper was of inestimable assistance. Rabbi Daniel Roberts of Temple Emanu-El,
Cleveland, Ohio, provided helpful insights, materials, and comment. The questions
posed by Cleveland-Marshall College of Law visiting Baker-Hostetler scholar, Samuel
Gorovitz, together with his gentle editorial suggestions, led to clarifications
instrumental to this article. The hospitality and assistance of the professional library
staff of the Cleveland College of Jewish Studies was invaluable.
A personal note: This article focuses on Jewish law, a subject which cannot be fully
divorced from aspects of religion. Some references to God were, therefore, inevitable.
As this is a scholarly work which refers to God in the abstract rather than the religious
and holy sense, the word is used without the use of devices such as "G-d" or "Lord."
Such devices could be found as insensitive to some as the use of the term "God"is to
others. To any who find the writing out of the word "God"tobe insensitive, my sincerest
apologies.
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placing the financial aspects of the dying process into perspective when we
know that a substantial portion of all medical expenditures for a given person
are made in that person's final year of life. Although only the most callous
would allow financial elements to determine life issues, their ramifications
2
upon the lives of those who survive can be too serious to ignore.
When is it proper to terminate lifesaving efforts? When is it proper for a
family member to assist in bringing about an earlier death? Does the answer
change if the assistance is provided by a medical professional? Does Jewish
Law provide guidance and aid us in drawing lines that are practical while
supporting the emotional needs of all concerned? Does Jewish Law permit a
modem definition of death (brain death), or must more traditional, ancient
definitions apply to foreclose organ transplant procedures which would save
or enhance life? 3 Is one view or the other the more moral or correct?

No one can answer these questions for any but himself. No hospital ethics
committee can impose its values and norms upon all patients and rest assured
that its collective wisdom leads to the right decision. No religion can pretend
to provide God's answer or the only resolution.4 Nevertheless, the wisdom of
the sages can provide elements of a value system, logic, and guidance which
can ease the anxiety and uncertainty of the decision-making process and
remove the edge of guilt which may arise from that process. 5
2
A fact all the more important in light of the criminalizing of efforts to transfer assets
to gain Medicaid qualification as set forth in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91, Title II, § 217, 110 Stat. 1936, 2008 (1996)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) to provide that the knowing and willful disposition
of assets "in order for an individual to become eligible for medical assistance... " is
subject to criminal penalty).
3

A heart or kidney transplant to save a life could be viewed differently from a
comeal transplant which improves the quality of life. The issues surrounding the
removal of a kidney - where both the donor and donee can remain alive but at risk - and
of a corneal transplant - where the donee's life is not at risk - are distinct. In turn, both
differ from the issues surrounding a heart transplant which is possible only upon donor
death.
4
Discussion of the wide diversity of religious approaches is beyond the scope of this
article. Major religious influences in the United States alone - Catholic, Protestant,
Islamic, and more - can provide learning and support for individuals. For an
introduction to such diversity see A TIME TO BE BORN AND A TIME TO DIE, THE ETHICS OF

CHOICE, Part III, Drawing Guidancefrom Our Traditions, (BARRY S. KOGAN, ed., 1991)
[hereinafter A TIME TO BE BORN]. See also KEvIN D. O'ROURKE & PHILIP BOYLE, MEDICAL
ETHICS: SOURCES OF CATHOLIC TEACHINGS (2d ed. 1993).
5
Personal resolution on moral, religious, or any other base may be more important
than legal resolution. Questions of criminal and constitutional law surrounding assisted
suicide were addressed in Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 4669 (U.S. June 26,
1997) (No. 96-110), and Vacco v. Quill, 65 U.S.L.W. 4695 (U.S. June 26, 1997) (No.
95-1858). These decisions establish that there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide.
Washington and New York statutes criminalizing such behavior were held consistent
with the Due Process Clause (Glucksberg) and the Equal Protection Clause (Vacco).
These decisions, despite their legal imperatives, will have no effect on the pain of the
decision-making process. Their impact on individual actions remains to be seen.
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Many have dealt with these issues on a personal level. When I was
twenty-four the question was put to me: "Should we let her go or should we
operate and buy a few days, maybe more?" I had no foundation upon which
to base a decision other than my instincts. Despite the passage of over thirty
years that decision remains a part of my life. Today, I am aware of sources that
would have provided guidance for, and eased the burden of, my decision.
These sources are found in the laws of Torah and their interpretations over a
period exceeding two thousand years. This article seeks to provide the reader
with an introduction to these sources and to suggest some answers found
within them. 6 To better appreciate the significance of the laws discussed below
a short digression into history and nomenclature may be of assistance.
The Torah is the bedrock source of Jewish Law. It is often referred to as the
Five Books of Moses, the Pentateuch, the Tannach, or even the Bible. To
Christians it is usually referenced as the Old Testament which includes the
books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. The Torah
was developed from approximately the fifth century B.C.E. and became a
7
recognized sacred text circa 400 B.C.E.
The Hebrew word Torah literally means instruction though to some it is
considered revelation. The Torah itself is a sacred object. Torah is the original
source of how one's life should be led and its laws are directed to this concept.
It is erroneous to consider Torah as synonymous with "law" rather than a means
of instruction, revelation, and scripture whose commandments will, if
followed, provide a complete way of life. For these reasons, in both the liturgy
and in song, the Torah is sometimes referenced as "the tree of life."
According to Jewish tradition the Torah contains 613 Mitzvot,
commandments or laws, which are to be followed. Many of these 613 are
religious in nature, but a substantial number, known as the Halachah, address
what we now describe as civil law and criminal justice. 8 The Torah, of course,

6

A straightforward discussion of many of the issues presented in this paper,
including application of principle to hypothetical cases in a manner familiar to
generations of lawyers and law students, can be found in FArrEL LEVIN, HALACHA,
MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1987). See also Rabbi Alfred Cohen, Whose Body?
Living With Pain, XXXII J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y. 39 (Fall 1996) for a more
"traditional" recent analysis of end-life decisions. Cohen presents conflicting sources
and explanations of law. For example, he asks whether the Gemara allows one to bring
an end to life through its teaching that in the town of Luz no one ever died. It seems that
old people of Luz, when life had become intolerable, simply went outside the city walls
and then died. Id. at 40. Despite this, and other examples, he concludes that the answer
to his question is no.
7
Secular sources suggest that it may be dated from as early as the 16th Century
B.C.E. Some religious sources believe it was given to Moses at Mt. Sinai (which would
probably date to the time of Ramses II - approximately 1304-1237 B.C.E.). For religious
reasons B.C.E. (Before the Common Era) and C.E. (Common Era) are used by Jewish
scholars and others in lieu of B.C. and A.D. respectively.
8
Jewish ethical practices can'be derived in a traditional manner described as
"halakhic formalism" (reasoning from the precedents) or a more modem approach
described as a "covenantal" approach based more on a determination of humanistic
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required interpretation and application. 9 This process began with the "oral law"
or Mishnah developed by a group of Rabbis known as the Tannaim and
culminating in its redaction by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. This process took place
from the 4th century B.C.E. to approximately 200 C.E. The terse interpretations,
laws, and principles of the Mishnah were more fully explained in the "written
law" or Gemara which was created by a second group of Rabbis known as
Amoraim from approximately 220 - 500 C.E. Their work is now known as the
Talmud l o and is seen in two versions: the Babylonian and the Palestinian.11 In
addition, interpretation and commentary upon the Torah was developed in the
Midrash. A key difference between Mishnah and Midrash is that the latter
includes direct quotation of Torah/scripture. t 2 Of course, collected works of
law and interpretation that are more than 1,500 years old need further
explication if they are to be applied to modem problems. This explication is
found in "Responsa" literature. Responsa were initially the work product of
Rabbinical scholars at Torah Academies in Babylonia from 500 - 1,000 C.E.
These scholars would discuss the answers to questions sent to them from
throughout the world and respond with a collective and authoritative force.

elements as contained in the same basic texts. See DAVID H. ELLENSON, How to Draw
Guidancefrom a Heritage: Jewish Approaches to Mortal Choices in A TIME TO BE BORN, supra
note 4, at 219. See also Daniel H. Gordis, Wanted - The Ethical in Jewish Bio-Ethics, 4(3)
GENERATION 43 (Dec. 1994) (discussing flaws in halachic formalism). Either approach
can cross lines of orthodoxy and lead to contradictory conclusions. Though the more
modern methodology is more likely to result in a "liberal" interpretation of "law," this
is not a foregone conclusion.
Transliteration of the Hebrew term is proper in at least three spellings: Halakah,
Halacha, and Halachah.
9

To the extent that it contains "law" the Torah can, perhaps, be analogized to the
United States Constitution as the supreme law of the land, absent the ability to amend.
10Technically this term refers to only the Gemara, but to understand it requires that
one also understand the Mishnah as the two, together, present a more complete tapestry.
11 The Rabbis lived primarily in these two distinct areas of the world. The Babylonian
is the more comprehensive and is usually the version referred to when speaking of
Talmud. Indeed, if the Palestinian version is meant, it is usually referenced as such. The
Palestinian Talmud was completed c. 375-90 C.E., while the Babylonian Talmud is
generally recognized as being completed c. 500 C.E. The most commonly available
English translation is that of the Soncino Talmud; the most recent English translation is
that of the Steinsaltz edition - a work still in progress.
12
The distinctions between Midrash and Mishnah are set forth in GEORGE HOROwrrz,
THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW, section 21 (1973). Midrash are explications of Torah (Biblical)
text in story, maxim, and aphoristic forms. Modem authorities also rely on the works
of renowned rabbinical scholars such as Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.), known as
Rambam, who contributed the COMMENTARY ONTHE MISHNEH and the massive MISHNEH
TORAH; and Joseph Karo (1488-1575 C.E.), known as Maran, who contributed the major
codification of Jewish Law known as the BET YOSEF and its condensed version, the
SHULCHAN ARUCH. Both Maimonides and Karo, because they were Jews, were forced to
flee from Spain. Karo was taken from Spain by his family in 1492 when all Jews were
expelled from that nation. Maimonides ultimately resided in Egypt and Karo in
Palestine.
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This tradition is carried on to the present day through various Rabbinical
13
organizations.
To understand the application of Jewish Law to issues of death and the dying
process one must first be aware of the importance of life, and saving life (pikuach
nefesh), in Jewish thought. Judaism "attribut[es] ...infinite value to human life.
Infinity being indivisible, any fraction of life, however limited its expectancy
or its health, remains equally infinite in value." 14 The Mishnah teaches that
creation began with a single human being to "teach you that to destroy a single
human soul is equivalent to destroying an entire world; and that to sustain a
single human soul is equivalent to sustaining an entire world."15 This core
value of the Jewish tradition, combined with the traditional belief that God
decrees the time of death for each person on earth, 16 has led a modem English
Rabbi to conclude that: "On the whole, in the Jewish tradition, we don't die
well. We rage and we storm. None of us needs that verse, 'Do not go gentle into
7
that good night'(Dylan Thomas). For us, life, chayyim, is the great blessing."1
To save a life, including one's own, any religious law can be violated. Even
the Sabbath can be broken to save a life. 18 Every life is precious and every life
is equal 19 as none can say that another's blood is redder.20 This does not mean,

13One beauty of Jewish Law is that, as the common law, it has the capacity to revisit
and reinterpret its sources so that it can always bring a fresh perspective to resolve new
problems. The Torah itself provides the authority necessary to interpret and apply its
laws. THE ORTHODOX FORUM: RABBINICAL AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY, 127

(Moshe Z. Sokol, ed. 1992). Just as the Constitution changes as it is what the Supreme
Court says it is, so too the Torah.
14

1MMANUEL JAKOBovrrs, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 276 (1959). Lord Jakobovits was the

Chief Rabbi, British Commonwealth of Nations, from 1966 to 1991. (All references to
"Jakobovits" are to Lord Jakobovits unless specifically indicated as referring to his son,
Dr. Yoel Jakobovits).
15

Sanhedrin4:5 as translated in THE NEW UNION PRAYER BOOK FOR THE DAYS OF AWE:
GATES OF REPENTANCE 5 (1978) [hereinafter GATES OF REPENTANCE].
16

As seen in the High Holy Day liturgy: "On Rosh Hashanah it is written, and on
Yom Kippur it is sealed: How many shall pass on, how many shall come to be; who
shall live and who shall die," but recognizing that repentance, charity, and prayer can
change the decree. Id. at 108-9.
7

1 JULIA NEUBERGER, ON BEING JEWISH
18

129 (1996).

The Mishnah provides that "every danger to human life suspends [the laws of] the
Sabbath." The exceptions are murder, incest/adultery, and idolatry.
19

This principle can have great effect upon a variety of medical decisions as diverse
as who can receive an organ transplant when resources are limited to whether triage is
a proper medical practice. See Choosing Which Patient to Save, (Responsa No. 75), in
AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA, 247 (Walter Jacob, ed., 1983) [hereinafter RESPONSA]. The

Talmud and Mishnah teach that creation began with a single human being so that none
could assert a superior lineage or claim that heredity was responsible for their own
character flaws. GATES OF REPENTANCE, supra note 15, at 5.
20
This well-known term comes from a Talmudic discussion in Pesachim 25b where a
man comes before Rava and says: "the governor of my city has given me the alternative
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however, that heroic measures must be taken to extend life where death is near.
when it permits steps that allow
How Jewish law defines death, and how and 21
death or save life, are the focus of this article.
II. DEFINING DEATH
The need to define death arises primarily as a result of advances in the area

of organ transplant procedures. An insightful analysis of the conflict between
a classical, religious based definition of death and a modem, science based
definition suggests that:
Our traditional understanding of death, defined by the cessation of
both breathing and heartbeat, is as old as human history. It is a
definition which is both highly intuitive and easy to accept. The
definition of brain death, on the other hand, is based on science, and
counter-intuitive. Thus, it may be more problematic to those who
profane.21
through religiosity, have embraced the sacred in lieu of the
For Jews
a precise definition of death becomes of crucial importance because
only the presence of the criteria of death which are recognized by
Halakhah relieves the physician of his obligation... to preserve life.
...From the perspective of Jewish law, there are a number of halakhic
and ethical questions which can be formulated regarding the
permissibility of this [heart transplant procedure] or similar
procedures. Chief among these is the halakhic definition of death, since
for medical reasons the donor's heart must be23removed without delay
if the operative procedure is to be successful.

that either I kill [a certain person] or the governor will kill me. What shall I do?" Rava
answered: "Be killed rather than kill. What makes you think that your blood is redder
than his?"
21Interpretation of Jewish Law often depends upon one's level of religious
observance. There are three primary divisions or levels of religious practice and
interpretation of Jewish Law - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Within each there
are further divisions and extremes such as rigorously orthodox Hassidic groups and
ultra reform Humanistic Jews. The basic sources remain the same for all levels of Jewish
thought and there is a fairly high degree of consistency in the approach to medical
questions, death, and dying. Although some distinctions are evident in the text, this
article does not seek to differentiate based on these approaches.
22

Joseph J.Fins, Across the Divide: Religious Objections to Brain Death, 34(1) J.RELIGION
& HEALTH 33 (Spring 1995). The reference to the sacred and profane is predicated on
MIRCEA ELEADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE (1987).
23

J. DAVID BLEICH, CoNTEMPoRARY HALAKIIC PROBLEMS, Ch. XVI, at 375-76,

Establishing Criteriaof Death (1977). For discussion regarding the definition of death in
terms of medical principles and rabbinical sources see Abraham Steinberg, The Definition
of Death, in MEDICINE AND JEWISH LAW 137-67 (Fred Rosner, ed. 1990).
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Unless brain death can be viewed as death under the halachic definition, any
doctor who performs a heart transplant could be viewed as in violation of his
obligation to save life. In addition, highly regarded authority perceives a
definition based on brain death as one which has substantial moral overtones
24
in that it rejects the value of the life of a person who is permanently comatose.
The combination of Jewish legal and moral analyses has led to substantial
conflict among scholars.
This conflict emerges in a wide variety of circumstances. A recent case in
Israel has put many of the issues into an emotional crucible and fascinating
perspective. The question before the court was whether a caesarean section
could be performed on a brain dead woman in order to deliver the baby. The
ultimate decision, in accord with the wishes of the husband, was in the
negative. However, the case appears to have spawned substantial debate
among halachic authorities. 25
Until the 1980s the primary Jewish thought was that a heartbeat or
respiration, not brain death, governed the determination. Various authorities
assert that under Talmudic law breathing was taken as the primary definer of
life and its cessation marked the moment of death. 26 The classical definition is
predicated on a Talmudic discussion which indicates that the law of the
Sabbath can be broken to preserve a human life.27 The illustration is that of a
building which falls upon a person and that, in an effort to save the life, the
debris must be removed even if it is highly probable that the trapped person is
dead. Once it is established with certainty that death has taken place, no further
violation of the Sabbath is permitted. The determination of death is made by
freeing debris until the nose is reached so that respiration can be determined.
Various commentators then establish how this discussion reveals a definition

24
For example, in his dissent to the Report of the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, Rabbi Bleich (an Orthodox Rabbi) argued that "adoption of a brain death
statute is nothing other than a moral judgment to the effect that there is no human value
which augurs in favor of the preservation of the life of an irreversibly comatose patient."
J. David Bleich as quoted in Fins, supra note 22, at 34.
25
As reported in Edward Recihman, The HalakhicDefinition of Deathin Light of Medical
History, 1993(4) TORAH U-MADDA J. 148, 162-63. This article presents a comprehensive
yet concise statement of relevant Halachah to the present day. It also provides an
interesting review of the relation of early Judaic reasoning to that of geographically and
time relevant Greco-Roman thought with focus on the work of Galen (130-200 C.E. who
is described as the forefather of western medicine until modern times). As to the
Talmudic approach to the medical issue posed by the subject case, see also infra note 37
and accompanying text.
26
See ALEX J. GOLDMAN, JUDAISM CONFRONTS CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 214 (1978);
JAKoBOvrrs, supra note 14, at 277.
27
yoma 85a, discussed in BLEICH, supra note 23, at 376 f. Bleich also notes the
paramount importance of respiration through the Talmudic response to the question of
how much rubble has to be removed. The answer is that as the "spirit of life" is in the
nostrils, the nose must be uncovered regardless of whether debris removal begins at the
feet or the head.
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of death based on the absence of both cardiac and respiratory function. Any
hastening of death, any effort to induce the stopping of respiration or cardiac
function, no matter how soon impending death would otherwise occur, is not
28
to be tolerated under Jewish law.
In response to the negative effects generated by the classical approach, some
modem scholars have made imaginative use of precedent to argue that
defining death as predicated on brain death is halachically sound. These
approaches, if ultimately accepted, will permit physicians to take full
advantage of modem medical technology to save lives while, simultaneously,
permitting that same technology to terminate needless suffering of one person
and perhaps save the life of another. The modem approach utilizes a formalistic
analysis of Halachah in combination with an understanding of the human body
which did not exist when the Talmud was written.
According to Halachah, death is evidenced not only by the absence of
respiration and cardiac activity, but there must also be no movement of the
limbs. As noted in a discussion of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate's decision
regarding brain death, a person can be considered dead, despite convulsive
29
movements of the body, by analogy to decapitation.
Extrapolation from these concepts, and utilization of other Talmudic sources,
permits a definition of death based on the absence of brain function in a manner
consistent with current medical thought.30 The reasoning is remarkable.
In a recent text 31 it is argued that various Rabbis, most notably Moses
(Moshe) Feinstein who authored a Responsum on heart transplants, begin with
concepts of decapitation and end with recognition of brain death. Rabbi
Feinstein, who steadfastly supports the classical respiration based definition of
death, also states that if "by injecting a substance into the vein of a patient,
physicians can ascertain that there is no circulation to the brain-meaning no
connection between the brain and the rest of the body-that patient is legally
dead in Judaism because he is equivalent to a decapitated person."32 Rosner,

28

Such an act would be viewed as murder. FRED ROSNER, MODERN MEDICINE AND
JEWISH ETIiCS (2d rev. ed. 1991) [hereinafter MODERN MEDICINE]; ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM,
MEDICAL HALACHAH FOR EVERYONE 141 (1980). Rosner provides a more specific and
complete traditional definition of death as an "absence of spontaneous respiration and
heartbeat in a patient with no bodily motion." FRED ROSNER, MEDICINE INTHE MISHNA
TORAH OF MAIMONIDES 225 (1984).
29
INSTT'UTE OF JEWISH LAW, NEWSLETTER Does Jewish Law Recognize Brain Death as
Absolute Death?9-10 (March 1990) [hereinafter NEWSLETTER].
30
Much of the debate began with work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death including its effort to relate

irreversible coma to death. See A Definition of IrreversibleComa, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS'N.
337-40 (No. 6, Aug. 5, 1968), discussed in MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 263. For
alternative definitions see Steven I. Friedland, The Health Care Proxy and The Narrativeof
Death, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 95, 120 (1995-96).
3 1
MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 269-71.
32

1d. at 270-71.
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together with Rabbi M. Tendler, thus conclude that death can occur, Judaically,
before all organs cease functioning. They assert that the focus on whether life
exists in the person buried under the debris is irrelevant to modem medicine
which can monitor all functions. In Talmudic times respiration defined death,
33
but today the issue is confirmation of death.
This approach, in turn,leads to the concept of "physiologic decapitation" as
an acceptable definition of death in Judaism without regard to cardiac
function. 34 The reasoning can be summarized as:
1. cardiac function is not a significant factor in defining death in
early sources;
2. early sources recognize that cellular death does not occur at
the same time as human death - comparing to discussion of
death throes and a twitching of a lizard's tail from ancient
writings;
3. decapitation is recognized as death under Talmudic law;
4. complete destruction of the brain can be considered
physiological decapitation;
5. loss of spontaneous breathing ability is a crucial determinant
of death under Talmudic law and no such respiration is
possible without brain function;
6. patients who have all appearance of lifelessness and no longer
breath spontaneously are Talmudically dead; therefore
35 total destruction of the brain fulfills this
7. irreversible
definition.
Rosner argues that under this approach, and taking into account the realities
36
of clinical medicine, the only viable definition of death is that of brain death.
Various other examples from Jewish law are recited to support this
controversial conclusion. For example, the definition of death in the
authoritative Shulchan Aruch provides that persons whose necks have been
broken or whose bodies are torn on the back like fish are considered dead. The
reason for this, it is urged, is that in such cases there has been a severing of the
connection between the body and the brain. This means that Halachah
37
recognizes brain death.

33
Reasoning to allow modem methods to confirm death is all the more important in
light of Talmudic discussion mandating that a grave be watched for seventy-two hours
after burial because a person was once mistakenly buried alive. BLEICH, supra note 23,
at 384, relying on Semwhot. This, and other dangers, call for a period of time to pass,
usually thirty minutes, after the end of respiration and cardiac function before a person
can be declared dead under Jewish law. Such delays could have substantial effects upon
the ability to transplant.
34

MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 271.

35

Id. at 271-72 (quoting E. J.Veith, et. al., Brain Death: I. A Status Report of Medical and
Ethical Considerations,238 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1651-55 (1977)).
36
1d. at 272. Moreover, 'The classic 'respiratory and circulatory death' is in realty
brain death." Id. at 272-73.
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A more straightforward approach, rejecting rigid halachic formalism though
not Halachah, simply declares that to rely on rabbinic sources which speak only
of respiration and circulation says "nothing about the rabbis' view of brain
death.' 38 The reason for this is that rabbinic texts address only that which was
known to the rabbis. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that they would
39
have rejected electroencephalograms had they known about them.
Jewish law and scholarship, just as American, has not yet reached a firm
conclusion in regard to brain death. 40 The struggle to define death is all the
more difficult as its moral, legal, and medical aspects are not necessarily
compatible. Jewish law and examples standing for centuries are being revisited
to aid in the resolution of this modem issue. As examples of law, logic, morality,
and necessity the Halachah may be useful to the United States medical and
legal communities without regard to any religious foundation. Though the
modem view and interpretation proffered by Rosner and others may be the
better reasoned for the twenty-first century, it must be recognized that: "A
definitive consensus of halachic authorities has not yet been reached regarding
the point at which a person is held to be dead in the case of brain-stem death
41
with the heart still beating."

3 7
MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 273. Additional support is provided based on
(1) a fifteenth century Rabbi who observed that if there is no respiration through the
nose, as an organ of servitude to the brain, then none of the Rabbis had any doubt that
life had departed from the brain, and (2) the well-known precedent of the death of a
pregnant woman where her unborn child may be alive. An immediate cesarean is
prohibited because we cannot recognize the precise moment of death in that the woman
might only be in a coma and the operation could kill her. On the other hand, if death
was certain, as by an accidental decapitation, an immediate cesarean is required in an
effort to save the life of the child. Id. at 273-74, discussing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Orach
Chayim 330:5.

38

Gordis, supra note 8, at 45.
1d. This approach would enable heart transplants and be consistent with medical
understanding of death. Id.
40
The current debate is quite contentious. See Robert H. Schulman, letter to the editor,
39

29(2) TRADITION 102 (Winter 1995).
41 ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO MEDICAL HALACHAH, 173

(1990) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, GUIDE]. The absence of consensus is evident when the
conclusions of scholars such as Rosner are compared to those of Bleich. Bleich, after
extensive discussion and despite his keen understanding of modem medical advances,
asserts that "Brain death and irreversible coma are not acceptable definitions of death
insofar as Halachah is concerned. The sole criterion of death... is total cessation of both
cardiac and respiratory activity." BLEICH, supra note 23, at 391. This position was more
recently reiterated in a criticism of the Chief Rabbinate's decision; See also NEWSLETTER,
supra note 29, at 10.
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III. ORGAN TRANSPLANTS

The traditional approach to defining death now causes a direct conflict
between the sanctity of life and the body and the duty to preserve life. 42 Organ
transplant decisions often raise conflicts with mandates of Jewish law which,
unless resolved, would preclude many forms of organ transplant.
Some scholars, to conclude that organ transplants are halachically valid,
assert that the principle of saving life supersedes all competing biblical
prohibitions. 43 Other Jewish authorities attain this objective by recognition of
brain death as the marker of death even where a heartbeat remains. For
example, a decision of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel permits heart
transplants, thereby rejecting the traditional belief that such a procedure is a
double murder.44 The basic premise of the decision is that death occurs upon
the complete and final cessation of respiration. Since independent respiration
is dependent upon a functioning brain stem, the destruction of the brain and
brain stem must indicate the presence of death. 45 Thus, the heart may be kept
alive for purposes of a transplant through the use of a respirator to supply
oxygen as the heart is not dependent upon brain function.
Another approach is predicated on a combination of semantics, logic, and
avoidance techniques which reflect an ultimate simplicity: An organ
transplant from a dead person, which fulfills a living function, adopts the
46
characteristic of life, is alive, hence not dead, and therefore is not prohibited.
In essence, this approach is that the organ is returned to life thereby rendering
47
laws related to death irrelevant.

42

To allow organ transplant procedures a number of other halachic principles also
have to be overcome including those prohibiting taking benefit from the dead, the need
for immediate, respectful burial of a deceased with no disfiguring of the body, and
reducing the time necessary before the absence of respiration can be taken as a positive
indication that death has come. Suffice to say, in many cases, these barriers have been
overcome.
43

FRED ROSNER & MOSHE D. TENDLER, PRACTICAL MEDICAL HALACHA 88 (3d ed. 1990).

44

This decision, translated into English, is found in Yoel Jakobovits, Brain Death and
Heart Transplants: The ChiefRabbinate'sDirectives, 24 TRADITION 1(4) (Summer 1989) and
is discussed in NEWSLETTER, supranote 29, at 9.
45

Not all Jewish authorities agree. A definition of death that mandates not only the
end of respiration, but also cessation of cardiac activity and movement is still recognized
by many who would, therefore, reject heart transplants. Id. at 10.
46
This analysis is provided by Rabbi Issar Yehuda Unterman, the former Chief Rabbi
of Israel, and is discussed in many texts including MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at
284, where it appears that the statement originally applied to justify a corneal transplant.
Extension of this principle to other organ transplants would represent a logical
progression supporting all transplants provided only that they were not the cause of
the donor's death.
47
This reasoning supports corneal transplants even among many Orthodox scholars.
See also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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From a practical perspective, Jewish law initially defined death in a manner
consistent with medical knowledge and societal needs as they existed centuries
ago. A primary scholar and codifier of Jewish law, Maimonides, was a
physician. For centuries a definition predicated on respiration and cardiac
function was effective and consistent with medical knowledge.
When medical knowledge advanced into the realm of brain function as a
definitive basis for marking death, while organ transplant procedures were
simultaneously creating living miracles, it became essential for the rabbis to
redefine death. Failure to do so would have meant that Jewish law would
compel loss of life when life could be saved. This result would violate a core
value of Judaism. Unable to accept such a result, Jewish law redefined its
priorities, reordered its logic, and made organ transplants available. Although
the Torah's role as a "tree of life" may have begun as a means for each of us to
live in harmony with God and with others, its meaning today also can provide
a physical element. Its proper interpretation makes life itself possible and aids
us in determining when and how life can end.
Diverse authority suggests that the concept of saving a life, pikuach nefesh, is
of such significance as to override virtually all biblical laws that would
otherwise prohibit organ transplants. 48 The great weight given to this principle
is also consistent with
the recognized principle that there is no obligation to
"resurrect the dead."49 Rosner and Tendler thus conclude that a variety of
medical procedures are halachically permitted including:
1. Bone marrow donations for transplant. Here the danger to the
donor is small whereas the benefit to the donee is high as
absent such treatment death is likely.
2. Cadaver organ donations because they can save a life. Where
the donation is voluntary all questions of dishonoring the dead
are removed and5 °any question of deriving benefit from the
dead is set aside.
3. Kidney and blood donations from living donors are permitted
despite the injunctions against placing one's life in danger. One
can place himself into possible 51
danger where doing so will
save another from certain death.

48

This is consistent with analysis of scripture by Maimonides and others that, for

example, "and thou shalt restore it to him" Deut. 22:2 references the restoration of health
rather than only property. See ROSNER & TENDLER, supra note 43, at 87.
49

BLEICH, supra note 23, at 289.

50

Similar issues surrounded the question of corneal transplants before a consensus
was reached permitting such transplants. Indeed, a donation to an eye bank is permitted
as the likelihood of immediate use of the cornea is great enough to consider the recipient
as "at hand."
51
1d. at 87-89. Within the Orthodox community, however, there is substantial belief
that a corneal transplant is permitted only when the cornea can be immediately
implanted into the donee. This view rejects the use of eye banks.
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Similar results are recognized by Rabbi Solomon B. Freehof. In a Responsa
written in 1968, he addressed the question of transplanting parts of a dead body
into a living person. 52 As a foundation for this Responsa, Freehof observes that
nothing may be done to hasten death in order to harvest an organ and
recognizes that tests as to the definition of death will become strict. The issue
in this Responsa is not the definition of death, but the morality and legality under Jewish law - of using the organs of the dead. The conclusion reached,
that such transplants are permitted, is not without difficulty as there are
inherent contradictions in the law. These contradictions must be reconciled if
such transplants are to be permitted.
At the outset it is noted that the Talmud permits the use of any material for
53
healing other than those associated with idolatry, immorality, and bloodshed.
The significance of this broad allowance of healing materials is clarified by
Maimonides who writes that one who is in danger of death who is told, by his
physician, that he can be cured by an object or material forbidden by Torah,
must nevertheless "obey the physician and be cured.' 54 This concept is further
codified in the Shulchan Aruch.55 As organ transplants from the dead do not
involve any of the forbidden materials, it would seem that there is no obstacle
to transplantation. The difficulties lie in other principles: the body of the dead
may not be used to benefit the living, and the duty to bury the entire body.
Logic dictates that taking an organ from the dead to save another provides
a benefit to the other and is, therefore, prohibited. Such a prohibition would
run counter to the principle that life must be preserved. Freehof's resolution is
to scrutinize the Hebrew word for benefit (hana-a) and recognize that it can be
interpreted not as a general term, but as one demanding "satisfaction" as in the
sense of satisfaction derived from food. No such benefit exists and, therefore,
no benefit from the dead is gained. This may not be as counter-intuitive or
creative as Unterman's view that the organ is alive, but it works equally well.
As to the need to bury the entire body, there is a notable dearth of precedent.
The earliest precedent appears to be a Responsum of David ibn Zimri
56
(1479-1589) regarding the use of the flesh of mummies for healing purposes.
Freehof (a Reform Rabbi) relies on two Responsa written by Moses Feinstein

52
RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 291, Responsa No. 86, Surgical Transplants.Additional
responsa, in the same text, treat Using the Blood of the Dead (Responsa No. 83) and the
Use of the Cornea of the Dead (Responsa No. 85). Responsa No. 84, Transplantingthe Eyes
of Deceased Persons,was written by Israel Bettan and concludes that: "removal of the
eyes of a deceased person in order to restore sight to the blind is not an act of mutilation,
which is forbidden, but an act of healing and restoration, which in Jewish law takes
precedence over almost all other religious injunctions." Id. at 288.
53

1d. Responsa No. 86, at 292 quoting Pesachim 25a.

541d.
55

REsPONSA, supra note 19, at 292
1d. at 294. This practice was apparently common in medieval times. It, of course,
places little light on the modem issues surrounding organ transplantation.
56
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who is described as a prime Orthodox author of Responsa. Here we see
reasoning similar to that of Unterman though in the context of a bone transplant
- "when a part of a body is taken by a surgeon and put into a living body, it
becomes part of a living body; its status as part of the dead which needs to be
buried is now void."57 Moreover, a fascinating distinction is drawn between
the fact that when the operation occurs there is no hana-a for the patient, only
misery. The hana-a comes when the transplant comes to life. At this point it is
58
alive and all issues as to deriving benefit from the dead are irrelevant.
The reasoning summarized above applies with equal force to heart
transplants. The primary issue regarding such a transplant, which
differentiates it from some others, is the need for the presence of halachically
recognized death. Another issue, raised by Rabbi Unterman, is that the
likelihood of survival after the transplant must exceed that of potential failure.
This thought runs counter to the principle that fatally sick persons, in danger
of death, can undertake dangerous treatment even if the risk exceeds the
benefit. The rationale for this limiting factor, which is not uniformly
recognized, is that the donee's heart is removed before the transplant at which
time the presumption that one is alive and has a "hold on life" (chezkat chayytim)
is ended. This loss necessitates that there be a greater likelihood of success. 59 It
is also necessary to be sure that there is always medical life and that at no time
was the donee legally dead. A failure to guarantee the absence of death would
devastate the capacity of Jewish law to permit heart transplants as implanting
a new heart after death would be to resurrect the dead - an act of which only a
60
higher authority is capable.
Finally, the theory that heart transplants comprise a double murder (the
recipient whose heart is removed cannot be legally alive, and the donor whose
heart is removed before he is halachically dead) 61 must be resolved. Based on
his interpretation of the Feinstein Responsa, Rosner concludes that as the
obstacles to transplant raised by Feinstein have been removed, Feinstein
"would probably sanction cardiac transplantation provided the donor is
definitely deceased at the time his heart is removed." 62 Regardless of whether
Rosner correctly interprets the position of Feinstein or others, the conclusion
that Jewish law permits heart transplants in order to save life - pikuach nefesh -

57

1d. at 295.

58

Id.

59

MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 289-90. The support comes, at least in part,
from reasoning regarding whether a chicken, with no apparent heart, could be viewed
as kosher within the meaning of the dietary laws. How is that for reasoningby analogy!
60

1d. at 292.
61 id. (noting the authority of Moshe Feinstein).
62
1d. at 293. The obstacles are largely related to the need for the donor to be dead
under Jewish law and that there be a reasonably good chance that the procedure will
succeed. As both can now be assured, the Rosner interpretation appears to be valid.
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is valid. As noted, 63 it is consistent with Ezekiel 11:19 and 36:26 that "And a
new heart will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take
away the stone heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh." This
figurative and spiritual passage seems to be a precursor of modem medical
miracles.
The analyses of these scholars is fine and no doubt result oriented. It is as
brilliant as it is practical. The approach, utilizing ancient sources, redefinition,
and close logic is consistent with centuries of Talmudic reasoning approaches
that have allowed otherwise restrictive concepts to become modernized.
Though extreme Orthodox voices may differ, these views are consistent with
a wide body of otherwise diverse Jewish thought. 64
IV. "CHOOSE LIFE' 65 - MEDICAL DIRECTIVES, EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE
This section will assert that Jewish law:
1. Under ordinary circumstances prohibits suicide;
2. Allows a person to instruct doctors and health care
professionals to let them die i.e., to demand compliance with
DNR (do not resuscitate) and similar directives; and
3. Allows what is sometimes described as "passive euthanasia"
by which an impediment to death can be removed, but
precludes any form of "active" euthanasia or assisted suicide.
Where a basic principle is: "choose life" and the traditional toast is
"L'Chayyim" - "To life," one must ask whether the three "rules" summarized
above are consistent with a philosophy, and to some extent a legal system, in
which life is the paramount value. They are.
These rules may also be consistent with the suggestion that although there
may be a right to die, 66 there is no duty to die. Once the door to assisted suicide
is opened the capacity of persons to convince others that they have reached a
point where death is a moral, fiscal, or emotional imperative is too easily
reached. The right then becomes a personal duty. That such a process is possible
cannot rationally be denied. The jump from any form of medically authorized

63

MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28.

64

For example, kidney (from both living and dead donors), bone-marrow, skin, and
cornea transplants - under competent authority - are all viewed as valid in a recent and
highly regarded text. See ABRAHAM, GUIDE supra note 41, at 172-73. Reform Judaism has
long accepted the propriety of organ transplants. The Rabbinical Assembly,
representing Conservative Judaism, approved an organ transplant Resolution in May,
1990 based on a number of factors including "consideration for the health and welfare
of others is at the heart of Jewish ethic." In 1995, after consultation among leading
Orthodox Rabbis in New York and Israel, a heart transplant from Alison, a young victim
of a terrorist bombing, was permitted to save the life of another person in Israel.
65"1 have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life - if you and
your offspring would live - "Deut. 30:19.
66

See Friedland, supra note 30, at 125 and cases cited therein.
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killing to mass murder is small. For many, including but by no means limited
67
to Jews, this lesson has been too well learned.
A. Suicide

Jewish law, consistent with Catholic teachings and the views of many other
faiths, condemns intentional suicide. 68 This condemnation is based on the
biblical prohibitions against murder 69 and that "surely the blood of your lives
will I require...."70 For purposes of Jewish law, intentional suicide is defined
in the Talmud through illustration:
It is not he who climbed to the top of a tree [nor a roof] and fell down
and died, as these may have been accidents. Rather, a willful suicide is
one who calls out: "Look, I am going to the top of the roof or to the top
of the tree, and I will throw myself down that I may die." When people
see him go up to the top of the tree or roof and fall down
71 and die, then
he is considered to have committed suicide willingly."

67

See

RONALD

M. GREEN, Good Rules Have Good Reasons: A Response to Leon Kass, in

A TIME TO BE BORN, supra note 4 at 147, n. 2 citing ROBERT J. LIPTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS

(1986), for development of how medically authorized "mercy killing" related to
programs of mass extermination. Green's article, together with the article to which he
is responding, Leon R. Kass, Death With Dignity and the Sanctity of Life, in A TIME TO BE
BORN, supra note 4, at 117, present a somewhat conflicting and most interesting
discussion of issues surrounding euthanasia. Though beyond the scope of this article as
they do not rely upon Jewish law as such, they are well worth reading. For example,
Green questions whether there may be a place for a new social form that would enhance
one's ability to bring his own life to an end through the misuse of medications provided
by a doctor. Green observes:
physicians may help supply the means by which these individuals
seek to end their own lives. In these cases, physicians are not killers,
but neither can they be described as merely withholding therapy.
Their conduct might be described as ... involving steps taken to clear
socially imposed obstacles to individual autonomy.... I deeply fear
the subtle or not-so-subtle forms of pressure that might be applied to
individuals to convince them "heroically" or "courageously" to end
their own lives. In our culture, we surely do not need talk of any
"duty to die."
GREEN, supranote 66, at 153. Jewish law imposes no duty to die and tolerates no effort
to persuade a person to hasten his or her own death.
68
Suicide is perceived as a moral crime and a perversion of life. J. SIMCHA COHEN,
TIMELY JEWISH QUESTIONS, TIMELESS RABBINIC ANsWERS:

CONTEMPORARY HALACHIC

ISSUES, 98 (1991) relying on Radbaz, COMMENTARY ON RAMBAM, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6.
69

Exod. 20:13, Deut. 5:17.

70 Gen. 9:15. According to Talmudic law this passage references one who strangulates
himself. See Fred Rosner, Suicide in Jewish Law, 18(4) J.PsYcH. & JUDAISM 283, 284 (Winter
1994).
71

MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 254.
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Subsequent scholars, including Maimonides, provide virtually identical
definitions.
In a Responsa concerned with relief of pain, Freehof notes virtually in
passing, "suicide is definitely forbidden by Jewish law." 72 This conclusion is
founded on three essential principles: suicide constitutes a denial of Divine
creation; of the immortality of the soul; and of the atonement of death. 73 Posed
differently, Torah commands that God alone has the power and authority to
create life and to take it. 74 The prohibition against suicide relates directly to the
command of pikuach nefesh. This mandate to save life can be waived only under
extreme circumstances such as self defense and war. It is broad enough to
encompass one's own life. 75
The importance of this command is reflected in a brief discussion addressing
the question of whether a Jewish physician must give a lifesaving blood
transfusion to one who, as a Jehovah's Witness, refuses such a transfusion even
though that decision could have fatal consequences. 76 The analysis suggests
that the physician should, if possible, refer the patient to another doctor who
will heed the patient's wishes. Where this is not possible, however, the doctor
must transfuse. 77 The rationale for this conclusion begins with Exodus 21:19,
Leviticus 19:16, and Deuteronomy 22:2.78 This grouping of scripture can be
72

RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 254, Relieving Pain of a Dying Patient,Responsa No. 76.

73

MODERN MEDICINE, supranote 28, at 259. In support, the authors reference multiple
sections of the Talmud as well as the scholarly opinions of Rabbis Unterman and
Jakobovits. Rosner, supra note 70, adds that some view a person who commits suicide
as worse than a killer as there can be no atonement and reaffirm that suicide violates
the body which is the property of God. The act of suicide also offends the belief in reward
and punishment so that a suicide leaves that person with no place in the world to come.
Id. at 284.
74"I deal death and give life; I wounded and I will heal." Deut. 32:39 (As translated
in THE TORAH, A MODERN COMMENTARY (1981). "Behold, all souls are Mine; as the soul
of the father, so also the soul of the son is Mine, the soul that sinneth, it shall die." Ezekial,
18:4 (As translated in the HOLY SCRIPTURES (1955) (The Jewish Publication Society of
America)).
75
Thus, we are taught that if two persons are traveling on a journey far from another
town with water enough for only one, then the one who possesses the water is to use it
all as it is better for that one to live than for both to die. The Talmudic discussion, in Baba
Metzia 62a, concludes that Rabbi Akiba came and taught (the majority rule): "Your life
takes precedence over his life."
76
RosNER & TENDLER, supra note 43, at 164.
77

The inherent inconsistency of allowing another doctor to take over and permit the
loss of life, but demanding that if the Jewish doctor remains on the case he must act to

save the life, is unexplained. A respected authority, Ray. Eliezer Waldenberg, takes a
position that negates this inconsistency. He asserts, at least as to Jews but likely to all
humankind, that one is not permitted to forgo treatment that might prolong life,
regardless of pain. In such cases medical treatment should be imposed even against the
patient's wishes. Cohen, supra note 6, at 48.
78

ROSNER & TENDLER, supra note 43, at 164, assert that the three sections combine to

impose a duty of best efforts upon the physician. Reaching this conclusion is no easy
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collectively interpreted to indicate that to refuse giving the transfusion would
be an act bordering on murder.79 A related concern, though not set forth in the
discussion, is that allowing the patient to choose death in this manner would
amount to suicide. Whether that suicide would be deemed "intentional" is at
least debatable in that the patient may believe that a more favorable outcome
is possible through divine intervention. This approach would negate any intent
80
to die thereby bringing the decision outside the halachic definition of suicide.
The emphasis on intent, despite the fact that specific circumstances
surrounding a death may logically compel a suicide conclusion, is an important
reflection of underlying values and concerns. These values are reflected in the
liturgy and traditions regarding burial, prayer, the period of mourning, and
related practices. A suicide victim cannot be buried in a Jewish cemetery. The
various rites of mourning which honor the dead, ranging from a eulogy to the
rending of garments, are not applicable to a suicide. On the other hand, rites
intended to benefit the family are maintained. Actual invocation of these
penalties is extremely rare. The rabbis will use every available means and
rationale to rule that death was accidental rather than a suicide.
These values are so important that there is, in effect, a presumption of
accidental death rebuttable only by the most compelling evidence. The quality
of the necessary evidence is illustrated by the fact that if a person declares "I
am going to kill myself," that person must first be warned of the consequences
of the action. If the person then goes into the next room after which a shot is
heard and the body discovered, it will still be ruled an "accident." Only if the
act is observed will the evidence suffice to support a conclusion of suicide.81

task as the sources do not do so in a direct manner. The passages, as translated in THE
TORAH, A MODERN COMMENTARY, supra note 74, provide:
Exod. 21:19 - [a person injured in a fight, who must take to bed] "if he then gets up
and walks outdoors upon his staff, the assailant shall go unpunished, except that he
must pay for his idleness and his cure."
Lev. 19:16 - "Do not deal basely with your fellows. Do not profit by the blood of
your neighbor. I am the Lord."
Deut. 22:2 - [as to another's animal gone astray] "if your fellow does not live near
you or you do not know who he is, you shall bring it home and it shall remain with you
until your fellow claims it; then you shall give it back to him."
79
The authors' recognize that this approach could have legal consequences and they,
therefore, caution that such a decision should be made only after consultation with both
halachic and legal authorities. ROSNER & TENDLER, supra note 43, at 164.
80

A benefit of this approach is that it limits potential conflict between religious beliefs
by allowing the patient to exercise a religious based choice without concern for the
suicide prohibition. The potential for death would, nevertheless, mandate that a Jewish
doctor reject the patient's wishes. Thus, a conflict remains. The doctor would be required
to elevate Jewish beliefs above those of other religions. A failure to effectuate a transfer
which would permit the patient's wishes to prevail, regardless of reason, would require
that Jewish law take precedence. The implications of this result are significant as they
bear directly upon religious belief and the free exercise of religion.
81 The need for warning and the illustration were provided by Rabbi Daniel Roberts,
Temple Emanu-El, Cleveland, Ohio.
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Moreover, by definition, persons under great stress and children are incapable
of intentional suicide.
Although the Torah and subsequent writings reference numerous Jews as
having committed suicide, these persons are not usually praised for their
courage or actions. 82 That some of these persons are recognized as martyrs does
not necessarily justify their suicides. However, to the extent that such suicides
took place under great physical or mental stress, they are excused and the
persons would be entitled to all rites associated with death and burial. 83 It
remains clear that Judaism regards suicide as a criminal act which is strictly
forbidden.
A key question, which could not have been asked until only a short time ago,
is whether a refusal to allow resuscitation is permissible. The concerns posed
by this question are related to, but distinct from, suicide, assisted suicide, and
euthanasia. Here we face two issues: the patient's right to execute a "DNR"
order and, regardless of the answer to that aspect of the question, the medical
professional's obligation to obey the DNR.
B. The DNR Conundrum
A do not resuscitate order implicates two distinct groupings: the person who
signs the order and thus expresses a specific desire and those who are required
to respect the order. The second grouping also has two categories: the family
or other representatives of the order signer and the medical staff faced with the
actuality of nonintervention to allow death. Both Leviticus and the Talmud
teach that one is not permitted to stand idle while another's life is in jeopardy.84
In deciding cases such as those presented by DNR orders, the conflict between
modem principles of individual autonomy and traditional societal group
values crystallizes. 85 The two forces are not reconcilable.
Assuming that a heartbeat could be restored, it is evident that from the
perspective of the patient a decision has been made to shorten life. 86 This is a
82 Examples include: Samson, King Saul, the lesser known Ragesh (Second Book of
Maccabees), the Talmudic discussion of the mass suicide of hundreds of boys and girls
who died rather than be forced into immoral acts (Gittin 57b),and the more well known
fanatics at Masada. For extensive discussion of suicide as illustrated from the Bible
through to modern Rabbinic writings see Rosner, supra note 70.
83

Also justifying suicide is the need to prevent adultery, idolatry, or murder.

84

Lev. 19:1, Sanhedrin 73a.

85

Similar issues arise in connection with the use of Living Wills. See generally A. Jeff
Ifrah, The Living Will, 24 J.HALACHAH & CorNrEMp. Soc. 121 (1992). The range of opinion
regarding living wills, particularly as related to alzheimer patients, is well explored in
correspondence of four leading authorities - Rabbi Jakobovits and his son, Dr. Yoel
Jakobovits, Rabbi David Cohen, and Rabbi Moses Tendler, in DEAR CHIEF RABBI 184
(Jeffrey M. Cohen, ed. 1995).
86
At least one alternative explanation is possible. A person may execute a DNR order
not because of a desire to shorten life, but in the case of cardiac arrest where CPR may
not prolong life, the person seeks to avoid a futile flogging.
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declared decision and would be, or at least could be, viewed as a suicide. Jewish
law precludes any shortening of life. Even a shortening of seconds is
prohibited. The requirement exists without regard to modem day concerns as
87
to the "quality" of the life that would be extended.
The patient could avoid the stigma of "suicide" only if he or she is suffering
so greatly as to be considered no longer able to act freely. Yet it is difficult to
view the signing of a DNR order as an action made under this form of
compulsion. If it were signed under compulsion, as defined by the common
law, the DNR order, a form of contract, would be invalid under the law of
virtually all states.
It is well recognized that no person has the right of ownership over his or
her own life or soul. A proper conclusion is that the patient violates Halachah
by signing a DNR order.88 It is possible to recognize this conclusion yet enforce
a DNR order. "People should not agree to sign DNR orders. But in the event
they do, perhaps bystanders are not obligated to expend an effort to save people
who do not wish to extend their own lives." 89 The reasoning in support of such
contradictory results may be outside the parameters of the logic of American
law, but it is well within the norm of the unique way of thinking reflected in
halachic analysis.
Analysis can begin with recognition of the fact that neither family nor
medical professionals can conclusively determine whether the order was
executed while legally competent yet under the type of duress which would
halachically negate the anathema associated with suicide. Regardless of their
opinions, the medical professionals - physicians, nurses, emergency personnel,
and others - may be faced with an independent decision. 90
Much of the reasoning surrounding all issues of life and death, including
those reflecting medical practice, are initially predicated on recognition that the
Sabbath must be violated to save life. This rule may, however, be subject to
some exceptions. There is Talmudic discussion of whether the law of the
Sabbath must be broken to save the life of a convicted murderer so that he may
live until the time for his legal punishment (at the time, death) came to pass.
Opinion was divided. The Mishnah Berurah suggests that the mandate to
extend life applies only to those concerned with the quality of life and that a

87

Absent a DNR order it has been noted that, as a general principle, resuscitation

procedures must be started where the patient is not beyond all hope of the restoration

of spontaneous life functions. There is some authority which negates the need for heroic
measures under such conditions if the result would be to merely prolong the agony of
a terminal stage of life. Jakobovits as quoted in DEAR CHIEF RABBI, supra note 84, at 132.
Others advocate a more liberal view which recognizes quality of life as a defining factor.
See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
88 These and related issues are discussed in COHEN, supra note 68, at 93-98.
89

1d. at 97.

90

The distinct concerns of the family are beyond the scope of this Article.
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convicted murderer had no such ideals. Where a person had no pity on his own
life, no violation of the Sabbath is required in order to save him. 91
The extension of logic is that if the patient is not concerned with prolongation
of his own life, then prolongation by others is not merited in violation of the
laws of the Sabbath. This rationale, though not uniformly accepted, begins the
thought process necessary to allow medical professionals to obey a DNR order.
The importance of the rationale, without regard to its overall acceptance when
initially set forth, is that it has greater application to modem medicine than to
issues of its time. This does not, however, circumvent the obligation of not
standing idly by while another's life is in jeopardy.
Additional distinctions are necessary to flank this obligation. Doing so, as in
other areas of Jewish law, requires a form of logic which may be uncomfortable
to those trained in the common law tradition. This reasoning utilizes four
distinct steps:
1. From illustrations draw a premise or principle;
2. Observe this premise or principle as representing a set of
"positive" indicia;
3. Ascertain a group of other factors or illustrations, often based
on matters or classifications omitted from the initial predicates,
which support an opposite or "negative" premise or principle;
and
4. Utilize this negative premise or principle to govern and
support a desired outcome.
The following examples illustrate the effectiveness and beauty of this
approach.
Analyses of the examples in which one must seek to save the life of another
reveal that in each instance the danger is imposed upon the person by outside
force or other conditions which suggest a lack of culpability. Examples include
the non-swimmer who falls into the sea, one attacked by animals, and one
attacked by thieves. The implication is that if the victims' own actions
92
stimulated the danger then, perhaps, there is no biblical mandate to rescue.
This conclusion is further supported by Rabbinical analysis surrounding the
right to pray for the death of one who is suffering greatly. If one is permitted
to pray for the death of such a person, it would seem that there is no duty to
save that person from a life-threatening situation. To at least one respected
scholar it appears that should a DNR order be established "those who witness
cardiac arrest, inclusive of professional medical personnel, do not violate
Halachah by withholding CPR to extend such a person's life."93
A somewhat novel argument has been made to support the right of the
patient to sign a DNR order. If accepted, this line of argument would further
justify compliance with such orders by medical professionals. From both song

91

COHEN, supra note 68, at 96 relying on Biur Halachan, Orech Chayymim 329.

92

1d. at 97.

93

1d. relying on the Mishan Berurah,Minhat Hinuch, and Rav Baruch Epstein.
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and Bible study we are aware that "There is a time to die.'"94 The Bible does not,
however, state that "there is a time to live." A reason for this is that when the
time to die arrives, it is not the time to extend life. Thus, it is improper to
resuscitate a terminal patient who has died.95
Any conclusion that Jewish law accepts the moral validity of a DNR order
in terms of the maker's right to execute such a document as well as the medical
professional's right to obey it, is subject to challenge. The moral efficacy of DNR
orders is rejected by a highly regarded halachic decisor.96 Nevertheless, strong
authority supports a moral and halachic right to obey a DNR order. That doing
so may represent advancing an improper decision of the DNR order maker is
illustrative of the inherent conflicts and paradoxes of any legal system
dominated by cultural values. Jewish law is not immune from such conflict.
Indeed, this type of conflict is a necessary part of the evolution of the law as its
ancient examples are applied to modem medical issues. It has been said of
97
American law that "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still." This is
equally true of Halachah.
C. Euthanasia
Every book of the Torah includes at least one reference to the prohibition
upon killing or murder.98 Whether the sixth commandment is interpreted as
"Thou shalt not kill" or as "Thou shalt not murder" is of no consequence in this
context. The basic question thus becomes whether euthanasia is a form of
killing or murder within these prohibitions or whether it can be addressed in
a less restrictive context.
Euthanasia or "mercy killing" is generally regarded as a procedure of
inducing death painlessly.99 It is often associated with relieving a terminally ill
person from the severe pain of that illness. Assisted suicide is sometimes
equivalent to euthanasia in its end objective: death to end pain. A distinction
is found in the fact that euthanasia need not be dependent upon the wishes of

94

Ecclesiastes 3:2.

95Byron L. Sherwin, Euthanasia as a Halakhic Option, 18(4) J. PSYCH. & JUDAISM 299,
305-6 (Winter 1994), relying on the Sefer Hasidim.
96

HaGoan R. Pinchus Scheinberg as noted by COHEN, supra note 68, at 98.

97

This quotation, attributed to Roscoe Pound, appears above the bench in the Moot
Court Room of the Cornell Law School. Its relevance to this subject has, after thirty-five
years, given me the opportunity to use it.
98

The citations, starting with Gen. 9:6 are set forth in MODERN MEDICINE, supra note
28 at 203-4.
99
Principles of euthanasia are not new. Such practices existed in early Greek history
(the term is derived from the Greek), were endorsed by Aristotle and Plato, and were
advocated in their voluntary form by Sir Thomas More. See RESPONSA, supra note 19, at
261, Euthanasia,Responsa No. 78.
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the patient and can be accomplished independent of those wishes. 100 Assisted
suicide requires the express consent of a person who wishes to die. Moreover,
euthanasia is a term that relates specifically to pain while assisted suicide need
have no regard to pain and can occur for any reason desired by the person
seeking death.101
This article addresses concepts of euthanasia and assisted suicide in the
context of chronically ill persons who are suffering substantial pain and those
who are terminally ill. There can be honest moral debate as to the propriety of
hastening death in such cases. No such debate can be found in regard to the
mislabeled concept of "eugenic" euthanasia: the killing of less than perfect
infants, those diagnosed with hereditary disease, persons suffering from
mental disability, or persons who are just different or otherwise undesirable.
Such forms of "euthanasia," carried to their extreme in the 1940s in Europe and
more recently in some African and European nations, are morally reprehensible
and categorically beyond any rational definition of euthanasia. Eugenic
euthanasia is murder, period.
On a sliding scale, the next most offensive form of euthanasia would be one
in which a person hastens the death of another as distinct from removing
impediments to death as the natural end of life. The former is categorized as
active euthanasia and the latter as passive euthanasia. Jewish law prohibits
active euthanasia but allows euthanasia in its passive form. Drawing the line
between the two is difficult in a world of advanced medical science. 102 For

100
This is not to say that euthanasia is inconsistent with a patient's desire. It is only
to say that where intent has been manifested by the patient, the end of life is more
consistent with concepts of assisted suicide. Whether euthanasia or assisted suicide
should be legalized in the United States is a subject of considerable debate and legislative
interest. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31
(West 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.547(127) (Law. Co-op 1996); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 9A.36.060 (West 1996). See also supra note 5.
101
A person seeking to commit suicide can often be viewed as being in great pain
though it may be psychological rather than physical.
The definitions and distinctions expressed in this paragraph are the author's
working definitions. They are largely consistent with legal definitions, but make no
effort to use statutory or decisional law. Statutory definitions are illustrated by 720 ILL.

COMe. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West 1996) (defining 'inducement to commit suicide' as "any
act done with the intent to commit suicide and which constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of suicide.").
Physician assisted suicide differs from euthanasia. "In assisted suicide, one person
contributes to the death of another, but the person who dies directly takes his or her
own life." Whereas, "[a]ctions that intentionally cause death are often referred to as
active euthanasia, or simply as euthanasia." NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW
WHEN DEATH ISSOUGHT, 82-83 (1994).
10 2 The line may be even harder to draw as between active euthanasia and suicide.
Jewish law permits medication to ease pain even if there is a potential that it will cause
death. Where a patient takes an overdose to end life, rather than to alleviate pain, it
could be considered suicide or "active-voluntary" euthanasia. Though many would
consider this suicide, some do not. See Sherwin, supra note 95, at 300. See GREEN, supra
note 67.
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example, the disconnection of a respirator could be deemed an improper act to
hasten death or an act which only removes an impediment to death.
Abraham suggests that three overriding principles govern the Jewish
position regarding euthanasia:
1. The only time that one can kill another is when the other is a
potential murderer - so that killing anyone whose existence is
not a threat to the life of another is murder;
2. One doesnot possess absolute ownership over one's ownbody
- there is a duty to return body and soul to God;10 and
3
3. Life, for any period of time, is of infinite value.
After some discussion of the Rabbinic literature permitting the
discontinuation of prayer to extend life, Abraham raises the distinction
between such an approach and a more active interference with life. Here the
view of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein is succinctly stated: it is forbidden to try to
prolong the life of a dying person if this adds to pain and suffering, but to
shorten life, even one of agony and suffering, is forbidden. Regardless of
motive, in part because it is not for us to question the ways of God, any effort
to shorten life is murder.104 On this approach we see an amalgam of religious
and legal thinking in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the
component parts.
Similar analysis of traditional law posits four reasons for rejection of active
euthanasia:
1. An individual's life is not his or her own, but belongs to God
and only God has the right to take life;
2. Jewish law is not concerned with the quality of life - each
moment of life is sacred;
3. Individuals are prohibited from inflicting self-injury including
the ultimate injury of death; and
4. There is no agency for wrongful acts and, since murder is a
wrongful act0 5one cannot act as an agent to accelerate the death
of another.1
Although the formulations differ slightly, the core reasons for rejection of
active euthanasia are remarkably consistent in light of the fact that they rely on
ancient sources subject to varying interpretation. Underlying the reasoning is
what appears to be a deep seated moral value that has long been a part of Jewish
tradition even without regard to law.
The more difficult questions concern passive euthanasia. Here the line
drawing is potentially arbitrary and confusing. There may be differences
103 Abraham S. Abraham, Euthanasia,in MEDICNE AND JEWISH LAW (Fred Rosner, ed.,
1992) 124-25 [hereinafter Abraham, Euthanasia].See also JAKOBOvrrs, supra note 14.
104 Abraham, Euthanasia,supra note 103, at 126, relying on RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE,
Yoreh De'ah 2:174. Abraham also observes that a doctor must make all efforts to
resuscitate a patient not in the final stages of death. ABRAHAM, GUIDE, supra note 41, at
180.
105 Sherwin, supra note 95, at 304, relying on a number of traditional sources.
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between withholding extreme lifesaving procedures and withholding food or
water. Similar differences may exist in regard to antibiotics, insulin, blood, or
oxygen. Relying on Jewish law, Abraham, a medical doctor, indicates that food,
drink, insulin, blood, and oxygen must be provided. 106 Where there is no
known treatment and no means to relieve suffering there is no need to prolong
life. 107 Rather, one should provide only supportive care and allow nature to
take life in the normal course of events. This line of reasoning is consistent with
the treatment provided through hospice care.
From his understanding of Halachah, perhaps tempered by his medical
experience, Abraham reaches a series of generalized principles that appear to
summarize the basic position of Jewish law:
1. Life sustaining measures such as food, drink, and oxygen must
be provided regardless of how this is to be accomplished;
2. Non-terminal patients mustbe treated as any other patient and
full resuscitative measures taken to prolong life even if only
for a short time;
3. Terminally ill patients who are close to death are treated as any
other patient in terms of sustenance and general care; but if
arrest takes place or other complications require major
procedures, then:
a. If the arrest is an expected natural occurrence, one need not
resuscitate and it may be wrong to do so. No desperate
measures which will add to agony should be undertaken;
but
b. If the arrest is not expected and arises from a cause unrelated
to the underlying disease, full treatment must be given
unless this will cause suffering above that due to the original
disease.
The logic of this position is forceful. Basic sustenance cannot be denied as
this violates essential precepts of Jewish law. Adding to pain and suffering to
prolong a life which is ordained to a speedy death is also prohibited. Under
appropriate circumstances no extreme measures need be taken and

10 6

Dr. Abraham, in consultation with one of his teachers, Rabbi Slim Auerbach, points
out that dialysis had to be continued for a comatose, respirator dependent patient who
had been resuscitated because she had been on such a program and therefore, for her,
it was normal. On the other hand, surgery was not required for a man with only a few
days to live and where surgery could result in immediate death. Here the surgery, which
could also have resulted in gaining some period of life, was not required by Jewish law
because it was risky, would add to the patient's pain, and the patient did not want the
surgery. Abraham, Euthanasia,supranote 103, at 129-30. There is an express prohibition
against removal of natural hydration and of feeding for a terminal patient to hasten
death because such steps are considered cruel. Where they are not cruel, they may be
tolerated. See Sherwin, supra note 95, at 306, relying on Sanhedrin 77a, Maimonides,
MISHNEH ToRA, and the Sefer Hasidim.
107

Abraham, Euthanasia,supranote 103, at 130-31.
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resuscitation efforts may even be improper.108 These general lines, drawn less
than a decade ago, are consistent with somewhat earlier discussion.
A summation of the halachic perspective is provided by Israel Bettan in his
Committee report answering a question posed by the Central Conference of
American Rabbis in 1948 as to whether the Conference should support
proposed legislation legalizing euthanasia. 109 The report, which was adopted
by the Conference, recognized that religious doctrine mandates acceptance of
the lot apportioned regardless of the extent of affliction this creates. The story
of Job illustrated the point. From there the report moved to the death by
burning of Rabbi Channaniah ben Teradyon. It was the practice of the Romans
to place a wet sponge over the heart to delay death and increase suffering.
When asked by the executioner as to whether the sponge should be removed,
the Rabbi rejected this assistance as it would have hastened death: "It is best
that He Who hath given the soul should also take it away; let no man hasten
his own death."11 0
Discussion of Rabbinic law follows to remind us of the divine nature of life
and its sanctity and that to abridge life by even a second, in any direct and
positive manner, is equal to the shedding of blood.111 This body of liberal
Jewish scholars rejected active euthanasia and retain this position to the present
day. Nevertheless, the report noted a distinction in regard to the facilitation of
a peaceful death through the use of indirect means.
Classical Rabbinic law permits the elimination of noise and the withholding
of stimulants. That which retards the natural process to delay death is artificial
and can be removed. 112 This sanctioning of steps to allow death to take its

108

To this extent these principles are consistent with enforcement of a DNR order. See
supranotes 84-97 and accompanying text. The positions can come into conflict. Any such
conflict should be resolved in favor of death.
9
10 RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 261, Euthanasia,Responsa No. 78.
110Id. at 262 quoting Avoda Zara 18a.
llModem writers continue to rely on this classical example. See Yaacov Haber,
Euthanasiaby the Book, 5(1) GENERATION 23 (Jan. 1995). Haber argues that the real issue
is not to define death, but to define life. Euthanasia is rejected, in part, because from a
spiritual perspective it eliminates the capacity to fulfill God's commandments or to seek
repentance. He states, for example, that "no experiments have been able to prove that a
person in a comatose situation is incapable of doing teshuva." Id.
112 There is some question as to whether even passive euthanasia can be permitted
before a person is considered to be in a state of goses. This Hebrew term refers to
imminent death which is generally defined under Jewish law as within seventy-two
hours. A person is in a state of goses only when that person is "highly unlikely," by
medical standards, "to survive more than three days." BARRY CYTRON & EARL SCHWARTZ,
WHEN LIFE ISINTHE BALANCE 143 (1986). Thus, Rabbi Jakobovits limits his approval of
euthanasia to the goses period. Within this time frame "Jewish law sanctions the

withdrawal of any factor-whether extraneous to the patient himself or not-which may
artificially delay his demise in the final phase." MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 208,
quoting I. Jakobovits, The Dying and Their Treatment in Jewish Law: Preparationfor Death
and Euthanasia,2 HEBREW MED. J.251 ff. (1961).
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course is inapplicable to the physical requirements essential to sustain life even
as to one whose condition is hopeless and whose pain is great. 113 The difficulty
in permitting even passive euthanasia is exhibited, perhaps unintentionally, in
the report's closing paragraph:
The Jewish ideal of the sanctity of human life and the supreme value
of the individual soul would suffer incalculable harm if, contrary to
the moral law, men were at liberty to determine the conditions under
which
they might put an end to their own lives and the lives of other
men.11
114
This paragraph makes several imperatives clear: suicide is prohibited; one
cannot aid another in the commission of suicide; and active euthanasia is
prohibited. 1 ' 5 Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, "does not put an end" to
life. Rather, it allows life to end. The difference is real.
In the Conference discussion of this Report, Rabbi Freehof suggested that
the Conference could say: "You may refrain from doing anything that will
prolong a miserable life," 'but to do something to terminate life is forbidden by
116
Jewish law.'
Although not stated in his analysis, the starting point for this conclusion is
found in the principle that"one in a dying condition is considered a living being
in all respects."'117 Perhaps the best example of both the distinction between
active and passive euthanasia and Rabbinical sanctioning of passive
euthanasia is the Talmudic discussion of the death of Judah the Prince. Freehof
summarizes this discussion by observing that the prayers seeking to extend
Judah's life were interfering with his death and so his beloved servant threw

113

There is substantial consensus that removal of hydration and food would not be
tolerated by Halachah, but that removal of a respirator remains questionable. But see
infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. It must also be noted that in an extreme
situation medicine could be given to ease the pain even if there was a strong likelihood
that doing so would cause death so long as the intent was alleviation of pain rather than
causation of death. See RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 253, Relieving Pain of a Dying Patient,
Responsa No. 76.
114

RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 263, Responsa No. 78.

115

Nevertheless, there is a line of reasoning which extends from the traditional
acceptance of passive euthanasia into at least grudging acceptance of active euthanasia
as individual choice. In part this is because Talmudic law may draw a distinction
between an act hastening the death of one in goses (terminally ill) and an act directed to
one who is terefah (terminally ill due to irreparable organ damage). As one in goses may
possibly recover to shorten that life is murder, but a terefahcannot recover and, therefore,
the act may not be murder. Thus, it is said that various sources "indicate the viability
and the defensibility of a 'minority' view supporting voluntary euthanasia when the
primary motive is to alleviate pain and suffering among the terminally ill." Sherwin,
supra note 95, at 313. The distinction utilized is questionable in terms of medicine, logic,
and Jewish law.
11 7 SHuLcHAN ARUCH, Yoreh De'ah, section 339.
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down an object from the roof to disturb the prayers and, at that time, death
118
occurred.
A similar approach is found in a Responsurn from the late 1700s which
authorized the termination of prayer to permit the death of a woman dying of
a "lingering" disease. Although nothing could be done to shorten her life, it was
permissible to stop praying and allow death to intervene. 119 Similarly, the law
of the Shulchan Aruch provides that one may not even remove a pillow from
under the head as this could hasten death.
Other sources support this form of analysis. The Talmud makes clear that
since a goses is regarded as living, nothing may be done to hasten death. Thus
one may not bind the jaws, or move him, or place him on sand or salt, or close
his eyes. The analogy is to a flickering flame in a lamp that is going out. If one
places a finger on it, it is immediately extinguished. Even the small act of
closing the eyes could slightly hasten death. 120 But one can, as recognized by
Isserles (known as Rema) in his explanation of the Shulchan Aruch, remove a
hindrance to death:
if there is anything which causes a hindrance to the departure of the
soul, such as the presence near the patient's house of a knocking noise,
such as wood chopping, or if there is salt on the patient's tongue, and
these hinder the soul's departure, it is permissible to remove them from
there because there 121
is no act involved in this at all but only the removal
of the impediment.
Nevertheless, not all of the Conference members supported the Report.
Some believed taking a position to be premature and others raised theological,
philosophical, moral, and practical questions.122 One, Dr. Samuel Atlas, argued
118 Various versions of this story can be found. In many it is believed that the
maidservant, who is highly respected, threw down a jar so that the noise would distract
Judah's followers from their prayers. It is also said that the noise of the prayers, as well
as the power of the prayers, prevented Judah's nefesh (soul) from departing. When the
prayers stopped, the nefesh was able to leave. This permitted Judah to die in peace.
119 Responsa, supra note 19, at 263, Responsa No. 78.
12 0
See general discussion and authority cited in MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at
205-7.
121
Id. at 207 quoting REMA ON SHuLCHAN ARuCH, Yoreh De'ah 339:1. Some would go
further, but they appear to represent aberrant views that have not received general
acceptance.
122
An Orthodox position, consistent with those who take a restrictive view of
euthanasia under Jewish law, is expressed by Rabbi Bleich. He argues that:
The practice of euthanasia-whether active or passive-is contrary
to the teachings of Judaism. Any positive act designed to hasten the
death of the patient is equated with murder...
The physician must make use of any medical resources which are
available. However, he is not obligated to employ procedures which
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that according to the Pirkei Avos 123 even one hour of repentance was worth
more than the whole future life and that, therefore, it is wrong to deprive even
a hopelessly sick person of the opportunity for repentance. 124 Dr. Atlas also
developed a thesis that any distinction between Halachah applicable to those
dying from an organ deficiency and those dying of natural causes (terefa and
goses respectively) no longer has medical validity.125 He concludes, therefore,
126
that the rationale of Maimonides would apply to preclude euthanasia.
More recently a group of Reform Rabbis addressed what may be the most
difficult of the questions both in terms of Halachah and emotion: can artificial
life support systems be turned off when they alone are keeping a terminal
patient alive? 127 The traditional Rabbinic distinctions and precedents are, of
course, unchanged. This allowed the Rabbis to recast the question into one of
when the "turning point" at which "independent life" has ceased comes into
existence. This question can be answered only by a return to the first issue
presented in this Article: the definition of death. The Responsa notes that
despite a division among Orthodox Rabbis (in 1980) as to whether Jewish law
can accept the definition of the 1968 Harvard Medical School ad hoc committee
report, significant Orthodox scholarship allows a respirator to be turned off to
determine whether there is independent breathing. 12 8 Bearing in mind that
Reform Judaism represents a more "liberal" branch of scholarship, this review
of law is possibly an effort to gain Orthodox support. The ultimate conclusion
is not surprising: "when circulation and respiration only continue through

are themselves hazardous ...nor is the physician or patient obligated
to employ a therapy which is experimental in nature.
Id. at 211 quoting J.D. Bleich, Judaism and Healing (1981).
123
A highly regarded text which is often referenced as the ethics of the fathers or the
sages guide to living.
12 4 RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 267, Responsa No. 78. This approach parallels a case

history presented in Abraham, Euthanasia,supranote 103, at 126-27 in which the patient
initially indicated that his last two years of life were a living death of no value. After
discussion about visits from his grandchildren during this time frame, the patient
remained silent after being asked whether those years were worth living.
125
Goses, discussed supra notes 112 and 115, references a death which is medically
certain to occur within three days due to natural causes. Terefa references a terminal
patient but without a specific time frame for death. Some authority suggests a one year
limit for terefa status. In addition, such a person must be dying due to an "organ
deficiency" which is a term perceived as distinct from natural causes.
12 6
RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 268, Responsa No. 78. There is also argument based on
David's order that the Amalekite be killed for the slaying of King Saul, at Saul's request,
after his failed suicide attempt. Id. at 269.
12 7
RESPONSA, supra note 19, at 271, Responsa No. 79. This Responsa represents the
collective wisdom of several of the most highly regarded modem scholars within the
Reform movement: Walter Jacob, Leonard Kravitz, W. Gunter Plaut, Harry Roth, Rav.
A. Soloff, and Bernard Zlotowitz.
128 d. at 273 relying, for this position, on Moses Feinstein.
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mechanical means,... then the suffering of the patient and his/her family may
be permitted to cease, as no "natural independent life" functions have been
sustained." 129
This conclusion is fully consistent with even far more strict interpretations
of Halachah. It is premised on the absence of circulation and respiration which
has always been recognized as an appropriate definition of death. The only
difficulty is that this Responsa allows medical tests to judge the existence of
respiration and cardiac activity. The methodology of confirming death, as
distinct from the definition of death, could be rejected under a strict Orthodox
regimen.
The logic of this Responsa, inductively, deductively, and as an application of
Halachah, is sound. Moreover, it makes clear that concern for the family is a
value of significance. Perhaps most important, it removes the moral and
religious based stigma that might otherwise inflict pain upon a family who
finally allows the inevitable.
D. Assisted Suicide
Any "liberal" approach to passive euthanasia or defining death must not
become a base for supporting any form of assisted suicide. Assisted suicide is
directly related to, and an extension of, active euthanasia. The Talmud requires
a physician to heal which, by definition, denies the physician the right to
actively assist in the patient's death. 130 The prohibition against active
euthanasia applies with even greater force against assisted suicide regardless
of whether the assisting person is a physician or one lacking any medical
training.
This is not to say that there is unanimous rejection of suicide or even assisted
suicide. At least one line of respected Judaic analysis supports assisted suicide.
Michael Kahan argues that suicides such as that of Samson, although a military
feat serving a higher purpose than his own death, was, nevertheless, suicide.
He concludes that in the context of Jewish law each person should be permitted
to reach his or her own conclusion.
Let us consider the example, say, of my self-hastened death (given that
I know I am near death anyway according to medical opinion) so that
one of my vital organs can be used to prolong the life of an otherwise
healthy person. Have I been like Samson? Or is it better to emulate
131
Rabbi Hanina ben Teradyon... to make the fateful decision?"
129

1d.; An approach similar to Responsa Nos. 78 and 79 is that of Rabbi Eliezer
Waldenberg as summarized in MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 208-9.
130
BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHIcs AND HALACHAH FOR OUR TIMEs 79 (1984), relying
on Bava Kama 85a.
131

Legalizing Suicide: An Exchange61(6) CONGRESS MONTHLY 15,16 (Nov./Dec. 1994).
Rabbi Teradyon, who lived in approximately the second century, publicly defied a
Hadrianic decree forbidding religious teaching. See note 110 and accompanying text.
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This view, expressed in connection with whether the state should legalize
132
It is
assisted suicide, represents a small minority of Jewish law authorities.
also consistent with the position of a developing Secular Jewish Humanistic
movement. 13 3
The vast majority view rejects both suicide and assisted suicide although the
current literature addressing assisted suicide is often conclusory: since suicide
is prohibited, assisted suicide is prohibited. "There is no question here [end life
decision-making] of 'assisted suicide,' [sic] that euphemism for murder or
suicide, which is always forbidden."134 Similarly, a Canadian Rabbi, Reuven
Bulka, strenuously asserts that "Kevorkianism" is unequivocally violative of
Jewish law.135 His reasoning begins with a Jewish saying, not based on any
Halakah, that "One who destroys oneself wittingly has no share in the
world-to-come."l136 From there he observes that scripture, Talmud, and
Maimonides all conclude that a suicide is a form of murder and, indeed, can
be worse than murder as there is no way to repent and seek forgiveness.
Moreover, for fear of taking one's own life, many otherwise acceptable
13 7
activities are prohibited.
With this explanation as foundation, Bulka moves to a short analysis of the
medical issue. Exodus demands that doctors heal and this mandate is carried
forward in Talmudic law as illustrating a mandate from God. The mandate is
"to heal, not to kill. A physician who cannot heal, for whatever reason,
including that the illness has advanced far beyond healing, has no right to take
life, any more than any individual has the right to take life."138 The logic flow
is precise: (1) physicians are granted permission to heal; (2) suicide is forbidden

(The spelling difference (Channaniah versus Hanina) is a common result of
transliteration.)
132
A similar result is suggested through subordinating this prohibition to the
demands of Kiddush Hashem, the equivalent of "quality of life," rather than by rejecting
the prohibition against suicide. This approach extends the teaching that there are times
when the sanctification of life and God is best served by the surrender of life as occurred
in Warsaw when ninety-six girls and women killed themselves rather than fall into the
hands of the Nazis. Yoel H. Kahn, On Choosing the Hourof Our Death, XLI(3) C.C.A.R.J.
65 (Summer 1994). Other examples are set forth supra note 82.
133
This organization supports assisted suicide under specific conditions and
safeguards. See Martin L. Kotch, Aid in Dying, XXiii (3/4) HuMANIsTIc JUDAISM 12
(Sum./Aut.1995) and the LeadershipConference Issues Statement, at 13. Neither Professor
Kotch nor the Conference rely on Halachah.
134

Cohen, supra note 6, at 41.

135

Reuven P. Bulka, Kevorkianism-Judaicand LogotherapeuticReactions, 19 J.PsYcii. &
JUDAISM 127 (1995).
1361d. at 128.
137

1d. at 128-29. One may rightfully wonder whether high-risk activities such as
sky-diving violate Halachah.
1381d. at 130.
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and no one has the right to assist another in such a forbidden activity; and (3)
a doctor who assists a suicide violates fundamental Jewish law and the right
to heal that was granted by God.
This approach, consistent with the recognized secular command of the
Hippocratic oath: "Do no harm," is judaically compelling. Whether in the
modem world it is as technologically or morally compelling is a question best
left to the individual.
V. CONCLUSION

Core values of the Jewish heritage are life and family, not death. An
interpretation of Halachah which permits a broad definition of passive
euthanasia without lapsing into acceptance of active euthanasia or its more evil
cousin, assisted suicide, is consistent with these values. Also consistent with
these values and the Jewish tradition is a modem definition of death which
recognizes advances in medical technology that were beyond the knowledge
or imagination 139 of those who created the vast body of Rabbinic law. This
approach will not only ease the suffering of families, it will allow organ
transplants to save the lives of others and to thereby achieve t'kun olam, the
repair of the world.
L'Chayyim!

139
Even a Jules Verne, Issac Asimov, Frederik Pohl, or Orson Scott Card of the fifth
century would not likely have imagined the medical technology of the late twentieth
century.
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